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The U.S. Supreme Court in District Attorney's Office v. Osborne
confronted novel and complex constitutional questions regarding the
postconviction protections offered to potentially innocent convicts. Two
decades after DNA testing exonerated the first inmate in the United States,
the Court heard its first claim by a convict seeking DNA testing that could
prove innocence. I argue that, contrary to early accounts, the Court did not
reject a constitutional right to postconviction DNA testing. Despite
language suggesting the Court would not "constitutionalize the issue" by
announcing an unqualified freestanding right, Chief Justice Roberts's
majority opinion proceeded to carefully fashion an important, but qualified
and derivative procedural due process right. While denying relief to
Osborne for narrow factual and procedural reasons, the Court's ruling
swept more broadly. The Court held that states with postconviction
discovery rules, as almost all have enacted, may not arbitrarily deny access
to postconviction DNA testing, and then pointed to the generous provisions
of the federal Innocence Protection Act as a model for an adequate statute.
The Court also continued to assume that litigants may assert constitutional
claims of actual innocence in habeas proceedings. In this Essay, I explore
the contours of the Osborne due process right, its larger implications for
constitutional interpretation, and, more specifically, whether the decision
has the potential to create pressure on the States to provide meaningful
avenues for convicts to litigate their innocence.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court definitively entered the DNA era in District
Attorney's Office v. Osborne,1 with notable care, a little trepidation, and
some evident confusion. The Court announced in the first sentence of the
Osborne opinion that "DNA testing has an unparalleled ability both to
exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty."'2 For the first
time, the Court heard a claim by a convict seeking DNA testing that could
prove innocence. The Court denied Osborne relief, and early observers
reported that the Court did more by rejecting any constitutional right to
postconviction DNA testing. 3 Although most courts correctly described the
Osborne ruling, several U.S. courts of appeals have described the Osborne
ruling as finding an "absence of a federal constitutional right to post-
conviction DNA evidence" and "holding that there is no federal due process
right to access to DNA evidence."'4 Those courts and commentators
misunderstood, or perhaps simply misstated, the Court's ruling.
1. 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
2. Id. at 2312.
3. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Postconviction Claims of Innocence, CRIM. JUST., Fall
2009, at 14, 15 ("The Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that there is no constitutional
right to obtain postconviction DNA testing .. "); The Supreme Court, 2008 Term-Leading
Cases, 123 HARV. L. REv. 222, 227 (2009) (discussing, in a section entitled Postconviction
Access to DNA Evidence, the Court's rejection of the substantive due process claim, but not
its recognition of a procedural due process claim); Adam Liptak, Court Rejects Inmate Right
to DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2009, at Al ("Prisoners have no constitutional right to
DNA testing that might prove their innocence, the Supreme Court ruled on Thursday in a 5-
to-4 decision."); Editorial, Unparalleled and Denied, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2009, at A26 ("In
an appalling 5-to-4 ruling on Thursday, the Supreme Court's conservative majority tossed
aside compelling due process claims .... "); David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rules DNA
Tests for Prisoners Not a Constitutional Right, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/19/nation/na-court-dna 19.
4. Young v. Phila. County Dist. Attorney's Office, 341 F. App'x 843, 845 n.1 (3d Cir.
2009) (referring to an "absence of a federal constitutional right to post-conviction DNA
evidence"); McDaniel v. Suthers, 335 F. App'x 734, 736 (10th Cir. 2009) ("The Supreme
Court has recently held that there is no 'right under the Due Process Clause to obtain
postconviction access to the State's evidence for DNA testing."' (quoting Osborne, 129 S.
Ct. at 2316)); see also Hemandez v. McDaniel, No. 3:09-cv-00545-LRH-RAM, 2009 WL
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The Court feinted in the introduction to the opinion by suggesting it
would not "constitutionalize the issue" by announcing an unqualified and
freestanding right to postconviction DNA testing. 5 While Chief Justice
Roberts's majority opinion did reject a freestanding due process entitlement
to DNA testing, the Court proceeded to fashion a qualified, derivative, but
nevertheless potentially significant new due process right. The Court ruled
that William Osborne had a procedural due process right to DNA testing
based on "a liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with new
evidence under state law." 6 The Court then denied relief to Osborne, for
reasons equivocally supported by the factual record. However, the Court
held out the broad federal Innocence Protection Act 7 as a model and ruled
that states with postconviction discovery rules, which almost all states have
enacted, must adopt adequate and nonarbitrary procedures providing access
to postconviction DNA testing. 8 Properly understood, the ruling places
pressure on states to create meaningful avenues to prove innocence.
Two decades ago, the first postconviction DNA exoneration, in 1989,
signaled a criminal justice revolution. Traditional postconviction law
emphasized leaving final convictions undisturbed because, over time, courts
could not reliably revisit facts, as witnesses' memories faded and physical
evidence degraded. DNA testing made it possible to reopen cold cases
decades after a trial and obtain remarkably accurate scientific evidence
concerning identity. As DNA technology steadily improved during the
1990s, law enforcement created vast DNA databanks, tens of thousands of
crimes were solved using DNA testing, and many thousands of suspects
were excluded using DNA testing.9 As innocence projects secured the
release of mounting numbers of innocent prisoners, legislators recognized
4953384, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 14, 2009); Aaron v. Norris, No. 5:09-cv-00158-JMM-JJV,
2009 WL 4884219 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 10, 2009). But see, e.g., Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672,
678 (3d Cir. 2010) ("There is no substantive due process right to access DNA evidence, and
procedural due process does not require that a district attorney disclose all potentially
exculpatory evidence for postconviction relief to a prisoner." (citing Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at
2319-20, 2322)); Cunningham v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 592 F.3d 1237, 1254-55, 1259-62
(11th Cir. 2010) (discussing procedural due process ruling in Osborne); Harrison v.
Dumanis, 343 F. App'x 218, 219 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing how Osborne "had no viable
procedural due process claim because state's procedures for post-conviction relief did not
transgrcss rccognized principles of fimdamental fairness"); Jackson v. Cooley, 348 F. App'x
245, 246 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing Osborne as "holding that there is no procedural due
process claim to post-conviction access to DNA evidence when a state's procedures for post-
conviction relief satisfy recognized principles of fundamental fairness, as well as no
substantive due process right").
5. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2312.
6. Id. at 2319.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8)(B) (2006).
8. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2316-17; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8)(B).
9. See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1629, 1631, 1646-50,
1653 (2008).
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the importance of DNA testing postconviction, and almost all states enacted
statutes providing access to DNA and postconviction relief.10
During that time of rapid technological and criminal justice change, the
Court lingered on the sidelines. Beginning with its 1993 decision in
Herrera v. Collins,11 the Court remained unwilling to recognize, but
assumed the existence of, an undefined constitutional right to challenge a
conviction based on "truly persuasive" evidence of "actual innocence. 12
Over the years, lower federal courts similarly assumed the existence of this
hypothetical right. In the 2006 case of House v. Bell,13 the Court next
confronted the question whether to recognize an actual innocence claim. 14
Paul House asked the Court to excuse a procedural default of his habeas
petition based on new evidence of innocence, including DNA results. At
the time, DNA results excluded House, but included the victim's husband
and thus did not necessarily point to the murderer's identity. Chief Justice
Roberts dissented in part, arguing that House had not provided "compelling
evidence of innocence." 15 In Osborne, Roberts cited to House, noting that
sometimes "[w]here there is enough other incriminating evidence and an
explanation for the DNA result, science alone cannot prove a prisoner
innocent." 16 That reference to the DNA evidence in House had already
become ironic. The Court had remanded the House case for new
hearings-leading to House's exoneration. Following the House decision, a
new round of DNA tests on multiple pieces of evidence, including hair and
materials from the victim's fingernails, not only excluded House, but also
the victim's husband, and pointed to an unknown culprit. 17 In May 2009,
House's conviction was vacated and the indictment dismissed on the
motion of the prosecutor. 18
The Osborne case was just the second time the Court had been
confronted with a claim of innocence that could be supported by DNA
testing. Unlike Paul House, William Osborne did not seek to directly
challenge his conviction. Osborne instead filed a civil § 1983 complaint
10. Id. at 1673-75.
11. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
12. Id. at 417.
13. 547 U.S. 518 (2006).
14. Id. at 555.
15. Id. at 571 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316 (2009).
17. David G. Savage, Murder Charges Dropped Because of DNA Evidence, L.A. TIMES,
May 13, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/13/nation/na-court-dnal 3.
18. Id. The Court has ruled in other cases in which the convict later was exonerated
through postconviction DNA testing. All were summary denials of certiorari except one-
the case of Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), in which the Court ruled that
forensic evidence that had been stored improperly and degraded was unlikely to have been
probative, and there was no constitutional violation where the evidence was not willfully
destroyed. Id. at 57-59. That same evidence was later tested when DNA technology became
available, and it exonerated Youngblood, also producing a "cold hit" with another
individual. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 95, 117 (2008);
see also Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-59.
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seeking access to crime scene evidence to test it using modem DNA
technology. Lower federal courts had considered several such requests for
DNA testing, with the circuits split on whether a § 1983 complaint was the
appropriate vehicle and whether a constitutional right supported such a
claim.19 DNA testing was a silver bullet that would almost certainly answer
the question of Osborne's guilt or innocence. The victim had been raped,
and the blue condom that the rapist seized from her and used while
committing the rape was collected at the crime scene by the police.
The case so starkly posed the question of postconviction access to
evidence of innocence that the State belatedly conceded before the Court
that the DNA test results could "conclusively establish Osborne's
innocence." 20 Osborne would pay for the testing; there was no cost to the
State. The State, however, was Alaska, one of only three states that still
have no statutes ensuring access to postconviction DNA testing. In Alaska,
prosecutors have never consented to a request for postconviction DNA
testing.2 1 The State adamantly opposed Osborne's request, for reasons that
remain opaque to this day.
Faced with a dramatic request for DNA testing that could uncover the
truth once and for all, but no constitutional precedent clearly establishing a
due process right to access the State's evidence after trial, the Court
selected a narrow approach. A smattering of constitutional rights could
plausibly support Osborne's claim, which lay at a complex intersection of
criminal procedure, postconviction procedure, and civil rights law. The
Court did not recognize an open-ended constitutional right of access to
postconviction DNA testing, but instead recognized a liberty interest in the
nonarbitrary application of state postconviction procedures. Following
prior procedural due process rulings, the Court noted that if a state creates
an entitlement, it cannot arbitrarily deny access to it.22 Since all states now
have procedures for claiming innocence, including by using postconviction
DNA testing, the Osborne liberty interest has great import. Further, the
Court noted that the federal Innocence Protection Act provides a model for
an adequate set of postconviction DNA access procedures. 23 That federal
statute ensures that DNA testing be provided to all convicts who can show
that the testing could "raise a reasonable probability that the applicant did
not commit the offense." 24 The Osborne procedural due process right may
encourage states with restrictive statutes to broaden access to DNA testing.
For the second time in the years since the Court decided Herrera, the
Court also gingerly skirted the question whether to recognize a federal
19. See Colin Starger, The DNA of an Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos, 99 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1045, 1070-71 (2009).
20. Reply to Brief in Opposition at 8, Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (No. 08-6).
21. Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (No. 08-6).
22. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
23. Id. at 2316-17.
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8)(B) (2006).
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constitutional right to relief based upon a substantial showing of "actual
innocence." The Court, as in Herrera, "assume[d] without deciding" that
such a claim exists. 25 However, the Court had never before indicated that a
claim of actual innocence could be litigated in a non-death penalty case.
Based on both the procedural due process right recognized and this
extension of Herrera, a decision that looks on first glance like a crude
denial of relief, instead incentivizes continued expansion of postconviction
rights for the potentially innocent.
Other aspects of the Court's ruling raise more questions than they
answer. The types of DNA technology at issue created some evident
confusion. The Court concluded that Osborne had state remedies available,
so was not arbitrarily denied DNA testing. In particular, the Court found he
did not invoke state procedure to obtain the modem DNA testing sought.26
In fact, as Justice David Souter pointed out in his dissent, the record was
clear that he had requested such modem DNA testing.27 Although the
Court also implied that it was relevant that he had not filed a habeas petition
under a state newly discovered evidence statute, the Alaska courts had
considered and rejected any such claim under that statute. Thus, the factual
basis for the result was quite narrow but also quite tenuous.
The Court also omitted any mention of the importance of accuracy to due
process jurisprudence. Criminal procedure rules, as the Court has repeated
time and time again, are intimately concerned with ensuring that "the guilty
be convicted and the innocent go free."'28 The Court has fashioned a range
of criminal trial rights and postconviction rules to achieve greater accuracy.
Failing to mention accuracy as a core due process value was anomalous in a
case seeking access to DNA testing, which, after all, has an "unparalleled
ability" to quickly and inexpensively get at the truth.29
In his opinions, Chief Justice Roberts has repeatedly sounded the theme
of going slow when interpreting the Constitution, and in Osborne, he
emphasized the need for caution in the face of new technology. 30 Justice
Souter's short and moving dissenting opinion was one of his last on the
Court and a highlight of the Term. Justice Souter seconded the Court's
choice of a procedural due process framework, while taking pride in acting
as a "stick-in-the-mud" by adopting an incremental approach towards new
constitutional rights.31 The Court had emphasized that because almost all
states have statutes providing access to postconviction DNA testing, such
experimentation should not be interfered with. Yet, the Court never
considered the reverse view that a near-unanimous national consensus
25. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2319.
26. Id. at 2321.
27. See id. at 2342 (Souter, J., dissenting).
28. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
29. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2312; see also infra Part H.A.
30. See infra Part III.C.
31. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2341 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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among the states justified holding accountable an outlier state that still
denies access to DNA testing. The Court has often hewed to such an
approach when facing new constitutional questions. Thus, Justice Souter
wrote that though "the broader society needs the chance to take part in the
dialectic of public and political back and forth about a new liberty claim,"
in Osborne's case, the Court should intervene to right a wrong, where the
State "demonstrated a combination of inattentiveness and intransigence"
amounting to a due process violation.32
Twenty years after DNA technology ignited a criminal procedure
revolution, convicting suspects, freeing prisoners, altering postconviction
rules, and leading to the adoption of new criminal investigation practices,
the Court finally left the sidelines and entered the field. Part I describes the
Osborne ruling, the Osborne litigation from trial through postconviction
proceedings, with a focus on the types of DNA technology that developed
during the long pendency of Osborne's case, and the role that DNA
technology played in the Osborne litigation and in the Court's rejection of
Osborne's claim. Part II develops the procedural due process right
recognized and its likely contours and implications, as well as the expanded
recognition of a hypothetical claim of innocence. Part III examines what
the Court's choice of right and scope of right reveals about the Court's
approach towards due process, focusing on the lack of reliance on any state
interest in finality, and the Court's language regarding national consensus.
I. THE DNA REVOLUTION AND THE OSBORNE LITIGATION
A. The Osborne Ruling
William Osborne, convicted of sexual assault, kidnapping, and assault in
1993, sought postconviction DNA testing of material from the crime scene
using new DNA technology that he argued could prove his innocence. 33
After seeking such DNA testing in the state courts with no success, as
described in some detail in the next section, in 2003 Osborne filed in the
federal district court a § 1983 complaint stating that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled him to obtain DNA testing that could
provide "profound evidence of his innocence." 34 The circuits had divided
on whether there is a constitutional duty to disclose such potentially
exculpatory evidence postconviction, and on whether such a right could be
asserted in a § 1983 complaint.35 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recognized a due process right to potential evidence of innocence,
grounded in due process rulings such as Brady v. Maryland,36 which
32. Id. at 2341, 2343.
33. Joint Appendix at 27, Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (No. 08-6).
34. Id. at 25.
35. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
36. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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entitles a defendant to evidence of innocence in the State's custody.37 The
Ninth Circuit then ordered that the State give Osborne access to the material
for DNA testing. 38
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling, with Chief
Justice Roberts writing for a majority also including Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.39 The Court assumed that the § 1983 claim
was not barred by its decision in Heck v. Humphrey,40 which held that
claims that "necessarily" imply the invalidity of a conviction must be filed
in a federal habeas petition and not in a civil § 1983 complaint.41 This was
itself significant; the Court has not often interpreted criminal-procedure-
related rights asserted in civil § 1983 complaints. The Court then held that
an independent due process right of the sort recognized by the Ninth Circuit
was not supported by precedent, in part because decisions like Brady
provide the "wrong framework," because they establish due process rights
at the time of trial, but not postconviction. 42 Most lower courts recognizing
a constitutional right to postconviction DNA testing turned to the Brady
right to receive disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence at trial.43
Doing so, as the Ninth Circuit did in Osborne, requires extending a trial
right to the postconviction context. This the Osborne majority found
objectionable, rejecting an extension of "certain familiar preconviction trial
rights."44  The Court emphasized that policy and federalism concerns
weighed against the recognition of a freestanding postconviction right to
37. Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 521 F.3d 1118, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd,
129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009). Perhaps, though, Brady v. Maryland is not "the wrong framework."
Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320. The State's possession of exculpatory evidence and failure to
grant access to it hampers any meaningful effort to pursue postconviction remedies.
Extending Brady postconviction is natural, where the Brady right is almost always asserted
postconviction, when years later concealed evidence comes to light. The Brady right does
not turn on the fault of prosecutors, but is geared towards disclosure of accurate information;
the test simply asks whether the concealed information could have changed the result at trial.
A DNA result could be outcome determinative and could enable other postconviction rights.
One can better assess Osborne's claim that his lawyer was ineffective for not having pursued
more discerning DNA testing, if one knows what the test would have revealed. Another
candidate right was found in Youngblood, which holds that a state may not intentionally
destroy potentially exculpatory physical evidence. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-
58 (1988). That right was not asserted in Osborne, perhaps because the state did not destroy
but refused to permit additional access for testing.
38. Osborne, 521 F.3d at 1141-42.
39. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2312.
40. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
41. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2318-19.
42. Id. at 2320.
43. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see, e.g., McKithen v. Brown, 565 F.
Supp. 2d 440, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Breest v. N.H. Att'y Gen., 472 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120-21
(D.N.H. 2007); Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 227, 236-37 (D. Mass. 2006) (applying
reasoning of Brady); Moore v. Lockyer, No. C 04-1952, 2005 WL 2334350, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 23, 2005); Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Attorney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d
366, 370 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
44. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2319.
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obtain access to evidence of innocence. Almost all states had enacted
statutes providing access to postconviction DNA testing, and the Court
stated it should not interfere so as to "short-circuit" such legislative
developments. 45
However, the Court then established an important procedural due process
right to DNA testing. Such a right is not freestanding, but rather derivative
of state law. Following prior procedural due process rulings, the Court held
that if a state already has an entitlement to postconviction DNA testing,
then the state must adopt minimally adequate procedures to access that
DNA testing, and cannot arbitrarily deny a person relief. The Court found
that Osborne had a liberty interest in the nonarbitrary application of
Alaska's existing procedures concerning postconviction access to
evidence.46 Since almost all states have such procedures, this right may be
quite significant, and the following parts will develop its contours. Having
recognized this constitutional right, the Court found that Osborne had not
properly requested the type of DNA testing at issue, and that he had open
state avenues for obtaining the DNA testing sought in his federal complaint.
As a result, the Court held that the State did not arbitrarily deny Osborne
DNA testing or provide inadequate state procedures. The Court found that
Osborne had not invoked certain state procedures and held that, "without
trying them, Osborne can hardly complain that they do not work in
practice."'47
The Court suggested that Osborne return to the state courts.
Alternatively, the Court stated that he could pursue DNA testing in a federal
habeas petition, including by claiming that the Constitution entitles him to
relief because he is actually innocent.48  The Court noted that since
Herrera, it has continued to assume that a claim of actual innocence could
hypothetically entitle a petitioner to relief.49 This statement in Osborne was
extremely significant. Herrera was a capital case and dealt with a right not
to be executed given a sufficient showing of actual innocence. The Court
had never before indicated that an actual innocence claim could be litigated
in a noncapital case.
Justice Alito concurred, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, arguing
that additional reasons supported denying relief to Osborne. 50 Justice Alito
emphasized that Osborne could have requested more advanced DNA testing
at trial, but his attorney chose not to do so, and that he should be bound by
his attorney's strategic choice.51 Further, Justice Alito emphasized that
45. Id. at 2322.
46. Id. at 2319-20.
47. Id. at 2321.
48. Id. at 2321-22.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2324 (Alito, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2324, 2329-30.
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evidence of Osborne's guilt supported denying him relief.52 Finally, Justice
Alito described how DNA test results may not always be definitive and
argued that, as a result, states facing backlogs in their crime laboratories
may have good reasons to limit requests for postconviction DNA testing. 53
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Souter in part, that, under either the Ninth Circuit's approach or the
majority's procedural due process approach, Osborne was entitled to DNA
testing because it could prove his innocence. 54 Justice Stevens emphasized
that the testing posed no cost to the State, as Osborne would pay for it, and
that the State had not explained what interest was served by denying access
to the testing.55 Justice Stevens also argued that Alaska did not in fact have
any meaningful avenue still open for Osborne to pursue DNA testing;
unless the federal courts ensured access to testing, he would not receive it. 56
A due process ruling would not hinder legislative development in the states,
precisely since almost all states already have statutes providing access to
postconviction DNA testing. A stronger due process ruling than the Court's
ruling "would merely ensure that States [provide access to DNA testing] in
a manner that is nonarbitrary. '57
Justice Souter authored a separate dissent, agreeing that the Court's
procedural due process approach was appropriate, because it would permit
more gradual and considered development of the right.58 However, he
argued that the Court, although adopting the correct framework, reached the
wrong result in denying Osborne relief because the State had "demonstrated
a combination of inattentiveness and intransigence" and offered no
nonarbitrary reason for denying Osborne access to DNA testing that could
prove his innocence. 59
B. DNA Technology and the Osborne Litigation
The Osborne decision hinged on an understanding (and
misunderstanding) of DNA technology in the 1990s. DNA technology
steadily advanced during the time that Osborne was tried and then pursued
appeals and postconviction relief.
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts makes several striking
statements about the role DNA testing now plays in our criminal justice
system and why state and local actors have an important responsibility to
adapt to these changes. The opinion begins by citing to the "unparalleled
ability" of DNA testing "both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to
52. Id. at 2324.
53. Id. at 2327-28.
54. Id. at 2331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 2336 ("Because Osborne has offered to pay for the tests, cost is not a factor.").
56. Id. at 2333-34.
57. Id. at 2339.
58. Id. at 2340 (Souter, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2343.
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identify the guilty."'60 The Court noted that "[m]odern DNA testing can
provide powerful new evidence unlike anything known before. '61 Yet in
the final passage of the opinion, the Court also recognized that our criminal
system, "like any human endeavor, cannot be perfect. DNA evidence
shows that it has not been."62 Such language acknowledging the problem
of wrongful convictions, albeit in an understated way, marks a change from
decades of scholarship and decisions doubting whether a wrongful
conviction could ever happen.63 The Court then noted that the "Federal
Government and the States have recognized" the power of DNA
technology. 64 They have invested great resources in DNA testing as a
crime-fighting tool and some more limited resources in the use of DNA
testing to correct errors. Vast DNA databanks have been created to help
solve crimes. States increasingly require collection of DNA evidence from
convicts and even arrestees. 65 Statutes of limitations have been relaxed to
facilitate prosecutions premised on DNA to occur many years later.66 DNA
testing is routine before trial, and many thousands of suspects are excluded
during investigations and long before a wrongful conviction could occur. 67
However, Osborne's trial took place at a time when DNA testing was just
taking hold. William Osborne and a codefendant, Dexter Jackson, were
convicted of a sexual assault, kidnapping, and assault in 1993.68 Osborne
was sentenced to twenty-six years in prison. The victim, K.G., a prostitute,
had solicited two men who raped her, beat her, ordered her to lie in the
snow, and shot her in the head, leaving her for dead.69 The passenger of the
car had raped her vaginally, using a blue condom that she had brought.70
She later identified Jackson as the driver of the car, and Jackson confessed,
stating Osborne was the passenger. 71 Osborne was in the military and had
no criminal record.
In addition to Jackson's testimony, two types of evidence supported the
conviction. First, the victim identified Osborne at trial. Her certainty at
trial contrasted with her earlier uncertainty. She had poor eyesight and was
not wearing her contact lenses or glasses at the time of the incident, which
had occurred at night.72 She testified at trial that she was "not totally blind"
without her contact lenses, but could not see well without them.73 She had
60. Id. at 2312 (majority opinion).
61. Id. at 2316.
62. Id. at 2323.
63. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 18, at 56-57.
64. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2312.
65. See Garrett, supra note 9, at 1654.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 1653.
68. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2313.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 167-68.
73. Id. at 82.
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described the second perpetrator as 25-30 years old, 6 feet tall, weighing
180-190 pounds, and clean-shaven, 74 but Osborne was 21 years old and
5'9" tall, weighed 155 pounds, and had a prominent mustache. 75 Further,
when the victim first saw a photographic lineup, she said that his photo was
just the "most familiar" and the "most likely."' 76 Seventy-five percent of
convicts exonerated by DNA testing were similarly identified by
eyewitnesses, and I have found that those eyewitnesses more often than not
expressed initial uncertainty, or provided initial descriptions of the attacker
that did not match key aspects of the defendant's appearance. 77 Of course,
absent DNA testing, we do not know for sure if this eyewitness was
mistaken or correct.
Second, DNA testing played a role in Osborne's trial. Police had found a
blue condom in the snow at the crime scene. 78 At trial, first-generation DQ
Alpha DNA testing results were presented. Such DQ Alpha testing
examined genetic markers that were shared by large populations. 79 As a
result, DQ Alpha tests were not very discerning. The results at Osborne's
trial, typical of such testing, showed only that 14.7-16% of black
individuals could have been the perpetrator. 80 The prosecution inaccurately
presented that evidence to the jury, repeatedly arguing Osborne's semen
was in fact found on the condom. 81 In addition, hairs from the victim's
sweater and from the condom were found "consistent with having come
from William Osborne. ' 82 The State also inaccurately told the jury that
Osborne's hair had in fact been found at the scene. 83 Unfortunately, I have
found that such invalid presentation of forensic science was common in the
trials of persons later exonerated by postconviction DNA testing.84
Osborne first began asking for DNA testing at trial. He asked his
attorney to seek more discriminating Restriction Fragment Length
Polymorphism (RFLP) testing, which was the most powerful form of
testing available at the time.85 That second type of DNA testing was far
more discerning than DQ Alpha testing. It could generate the types of
random match probabilities that we are now familiar with, determining that
74. Id. at 167.
75. Id. at 166-67.
76. Id. at 28.
77. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, MISJUDGING INNOCENCE ch. 4 (forthcoming 2011) (on file
with author).
78. Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 48.
79. See, e.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 27-28 (1999).
80. Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 119.
81. Id. at 123-26.
82. Id. at 105.
83. Id. at 123, 124, 127, 130.
84. See generally Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REv. 1 (2009).
85. See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND
GENETICS OF STR MARKERS 146 (2d ed. 2005).
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one random person in millions, billions, or even trillions could be expected
to share a profile. 86 However, RFLP testing required a large quantity of
nondegraded genetic material, and interpretation of the results was
potentially subjective. 87 Osborne wrote to an out-of-state expert asking for
help obtaining RFLP testing. 88 Under Alaska law, his trial attorney made
the final decision whether to seek additional DNA testing. She chose not
to.89 In his postconviction petition he argued that she was ineffective for
failing to do this.90 She responded that she did not request the testing
because she thought "Osborne was in a strategically better position without
[additional] DNA testing." 91
Since his trial, not only has DQ Alpha been totally displaced, but by the
mid-to-late 1990s, modern and much more powerful Short Tandem Repeat
(STR) DNA testing entered into wide use and displaced RFLP testing.92
One advantage of STR testing is that unlike RFLP testing, STR testing can
be used on very small samples; further, new capillary electrophoresis
technology permitted rapid and largely computerized analysis of genetic
samples. 93 In the late 1990s, mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) testing was
also developed. 94 Such mtDNA testing can now be conducted on hairs, like
those found at the crime scene in the Osborne case. 95
One final technological development accompanied the rise of modern
STR DNA testing-the creation of state and then national databanks, or the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), which now contains millions of
genetic profiles. 96 Any unknown DNA profile detected in a case can now
be entered into the national databank system, and any resulting "cold hits"
often solve cases. In addition, cold hits have often helped to exonerate the
innocent. I have found that in forty percent, or 110 of the first 250 DNA
exonerations, postconviction DNA testing also inculpated the perpetrator,
most often due to a cold hit.97 The combination of the development of STR
DNA testing and DNA databanks led to an acceleration in the numbers of
DNA exonerations, from a trickle in the early 1990s, to a flood in the late
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 162-63, 186, 226.
89. Id. at 185-86.
90. Id. at 14.
91. Osborne v. State (Osborne 1), 110 P.3d 986, 990 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
92. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 85, at 9-11, 33-35.
93- See id. at 12, 146.
94. Id. at 201-98.
95. Id. at 272.
96. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CODIS: COMBINED DNA
INDEX SYSTEM 2 (2007), available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/pdf/codisbrochure2.pdf.
97. See GARRETT, supra note 77, at 15; see also Brief for the Respondent at 5, Dist.
Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009) (No. 08-6); Brandon L. Garrett,
Judging Innocence: An Update, http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/librarysite/
garrett exonereedata.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010) (finding that in 110 of the first 250
DNA exonerations, the DNA testing inculpated a perpetrator, and that in 65 of those cases
this was due to a "cold hit").
2010] 2931
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
1990s. These technological developments played a pivotal role in the
Supreme Court's decision in Osborne.
With several powerful new DNA technologies available, Osborne
requested DNA testing, including more modern DNA testing, from the state
courts by filing a state habeas petition.98 In 2002, the trial court found that
he had no right to the testing because the evidence of his guilt was strong,
and because the trial attorney's failure to request the testing was "strategic"
and not unconstitutionally ineffective. 99 It was no surprise that Osborne
was denied relief. Alaska had no statute or case law providing any right to
postconviction DNA testing.
For the first decade that DNA technology was available, in the 1990s,
only two states provided convicts a statutory postconviction right to obtain
testing that might prove their innocence. 100 Many localities, though quick
to test DNA evidence that might prove guilt, fought efforts to obtain access
to DNA evidence to prove innocence. 10 1 Despite those obstacles, 252
people have obtained postconviction DNA testing and proved their
innocence. 10 2  Gradually, states came to realize the importance of
exculpatory DNA testing. Over time, fewer prosecutors challenged defense
requests for testing. In studying how all persons exonerated by
postconviction DNA testing obtained DNA testing, I have found that in the
vast majority of exonerees' cases, prosecutors eventually consented to the
DNA testing. 10 3 In the last decade, almost all states have passed statutes
permitting access to postconviction DNA testing.
One of just three states that still has not yet enacted such a statute is
Alaska (the others are Oklahoma and Massachusetts; Alabama enacted a
statute just before the Court reached its decision in Osborne).l0 4 No person
has been exonerated by postconviction DNA testing in Alaska, although
there have been exonerations in thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia. 10 5 No postconviction DNA testing has ever been conducted in
98. Osborne had originally sought only RFLP testing at the time of trial because that was
all that was available at the time. He amended his state court pleadings to request STR and
also mtDNA testing. See Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 158-59.
99. Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 17-18.
100. See Garrett, supra note 9, at 1693.
101. See Garrett, supra note 18, pt. II.C. 1.
102. See The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Apr. 17,
2010) (providing the count of U.S. postconviction DNA exonerations).
103. See Garrett, supra note 97 (noting that in eighty-eight percent of the first 225 DNA
exonerations prosecutors consented to motions to vacate convictions and that in eighty-two
percent prosecutors consented to DNA testing); see also Brief for the Respondent, supra
note 97, at 23 (citing this data).
104. See The Innocence Project, Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/304.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2010); see also
Garrett, supra note 9, at 1719-23.
105. See Press Release, The Innocence Project, 250 Exonerated, Too Many Wrongfully
Convicted (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/2350.php.
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Alaska. 106 Prosecutors in Alaska have never agreed to provide access to
DNA testing, nor has an Alaska court order ever resulted in DNA testing
postconviction.
In Osborne's case, the Alaska Court of Appeals considered a series of
potential claims before ultimately denying Osborne relief. The court
rejected a theory under the U.S. Constitution, but then considered a
hypothetical right to DNA testing under the state constitution and remanded
the case to the trial court to examine whether Osborne could secure relief
under a three-part test that it referred to as one adopted by several other
state courts. 10 7 That test was whether (1) the conviction relied primarily on
an eyewitness identification, (2) there was demonstrable doubt concerning
the identity of the perpetrator, and (3) scientific testing could be conclusive
on the issue of identity.108 In fact, no state currently uses such a test
(though the majority in Osborne referred to the test as "widely
accepted"). 109 On its face, Osborne's case satisfied those criteria. This was
a stranger rape, involving equivocal eyewitness testimony and not very
probative forensic evidence. DNA tests of the blue condom would
definitely resolve the identity of the rapist. The trial court ruled the DNA
tests could not prove Osborne's innocence and emphasized Osborne
confessed in a 2004 parole application. 110 The Alaska Court of Appeals
agreed, concluding that the DNA testing "would not conclusively establish
Osborne's innocence."'111
The court rejected a statutory avenue for relief as well. Alaska's
postconviction statute permits late-filed motions based on newly discovered
evidence, but that evidence must be new, or "not previously presented and
heard by the court." 11 2 The court noted that the evidence to be tested was
106. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 97, at 6-7.
107. Osborne v. State (Osborne 1), 110 P.3d 986, 994-95 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
108. Id. at 995.
109. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2317 (2009). All states' court
decisions adopting such tests (though none had those three parts) under their state
constitutions have since had such tests superseded by DNA access statutes. See Osborne I,
110 P.3d at 995 n.27 (citing state court cases); Garrett, supra note 9, at 1673 n.207 (noting
that all five state court rulings recognizing a constitutional right to postconviction DNA
testing have been superseded by statute).
110. Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 221 ("Mr. Osborne admitted in detail to
committing this crime in an Application for Discretionary Parole."). Justice Alito,
concurring, emphasized that Osborne had "confessed in detail to the crime." Osborne, 129 S.
Ct. at 2324 (Alito, J., concurring). That statement implied that the detailed nature of the
confession supported its probable truth. However, Osborne was privy to all of the facts in
the case-having attended his own trial. Further, almost all people exonerated by DNA
evidence who had falsely confessed before trial did so in great detail. We now know that
those details were likely disclosed to them. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance
of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1051 (2010).
11. Osborne v. State (Osborne 11), 163 P.3d 973, 981 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007); see also
id. at 985 (Mannheimer, J., concurring).
112. ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.010(4) (2008) ("[T]here exists evidence of material facts, not
previously presented and heard by the court, that requires vacation of the conviction or
sentence in the interest of justice.").
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not newly discovered, stating that the evidence was available at trial and
that no new type of testing was requested.1 13 Most states do not routinely
permit discovery under their general postconviction statutes, and decisions
granting or denying such requests can be quite variable."l 4 Osborne had not
sought relief under that statute, instead seeking discovery as part of a claim
that his counsel was ineffective. Regardless, the court held that "Osborne
apparently does not qualify for post-conviction relief' under the Alaska
newly discovered evidence statute, and then held that the statute also barred
Osborne from relief under the Alaska Constitution. 15
A technological issue became a crucial subject in the Supreme Court's
majority opinion. In the background portion of the opinion, the majority
noted in a footnote that "[i]t is not clear whether the Alaska Court of
Appeals was correct that Osborne sought only forms of DNA testing that
had been available at trial." 116 However, later in the opinion the Court
concluded that "[w]hen Osborne did request DNA testing in state court, he
sought RFLP testing that had been available at trial, not the STR testing he
now seeks, and the state court relied on that fact in denying him testing
under Alaska law."1 17 The Court then quoted a claim by the Alaska Court
of Appeals that "'the DNA testing that Osborne proposes to perform on this
evidence existed at the time of Osborne's trial."" 18
Regardless, Osborne did request both STR and mtDNA testing in his
postconviction petitions. Both were new forms of DNA testing far more
powerful than anything available at the time of his trial. Indeed, by the time
of the Alaska Court of Appeals decisions a few years later, RFLP testing
had fallen into disuse. There would be no reason to request RFLP testing,
and it is not clear that many laboratories would still perform it. The record
before the Court could not have been clearer that Osborne did not limit his
113. See Osborne I, 163 P.3d at 984.
114. 1 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 19:31 (Thomson Reuters/West ed., 2009) ("In
contrast with their adoption or adaptation of federal court rules in some other areas, most
states have no equivalent of Rule 6 specifically permitting and regulating discovery in post-
conviction proceedings."). The Alaska statute in question has been mentioned only in a
handful of decisions aside from those in Osborne's case.
115. Osborne v. State (Osborne 1), 110 P.3d 986, 995 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
116. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2314 n.2 (2009).
117. Id. at 2321 (citing Osborne I, 110 P.3d at 992).
118. Id. (quoting Osborne I, 110 P.3d at 992). The full quotation states that the physical
evidence itself (the blue condom) was not newly discovered and that Osborne's trial attorney
"consciously chose not to seek more specific testing." Osborne 1, 110 P.3d at 992 ("The
State points out that Osborne's due process claim is apparently barred by this statute because
the physical evidence in this case is not newly discovered, because the DNA testing that
Osborne proposes to perform on this evidence existed at the time of Osborne's trial, and
because Osborne's trial attorney was aware of this and consciously chose not to seek more
specific testing."). In its subsequent decision, the Alaska court did state, incorrectly, that
"[i]t is true that Osborne now proposes a different, more discriminating DNA test-but this
more discriminating DNA was also available at the time of Osborne's trial." Osborne I1, 163
P.3d at 984.
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request to RFLP testing. The Joint Appendix included state court briefs in
which he requested STR and mtDNA testing.1 19
The confusion over this fact nevertheless played a key role in the
conclusion that Osborne had "attempt[ed] to sidestep state process. ' 120 The
Court also indicated that Osborne should have used state procedures in a
state habeas petition. Yet the Court was not clear what procedures should
have been attempted. The Alaska Court of Appeals had found that Osborne
was not entitled to DNA testing under any existing state law avenue,
including any state statute or hypothetical state constitutional right.
It is obvious why Osborne would litigate for years to try to prove his
innocence and obtain his freedom. What was the State interest in denying
testing? After all, the State litigated for years and at great expense to
oppose Osborne's request for DNA testing. Alaska's position was never
particularly clear. Cost was not an issue. The Innocence Project, which
represented Osborne, offered to pay all costs associated with the DNA
testing. 121 Before the Ninth Circuit, the State had argued that test results
could not be material and could not show Osborne's innocence. 122 That
argument was at least clear, but it was also patently meritless, 123 and the
State abandoned it before the Supreme Court. After all, the State had relied
on the DQ Alpha DNA test results at trial to support its case for Osborne's
guilt. 124 Thus, the State conceded before the Court that a favorable test
could "conclusively establish Osborne's innocence. ' 125 If Osborne is
innocent, the tests might point to the true rapist. Justice Stevens began his
dissent noting "for reasons the State has been unable or unwilling to
articulate, it refuses to allow Osborne to test the evidence at his own
expense and to thereby ascertain the truth once and for all."'1 26
C. Denying Osborne Relief
The result in Osborne hinged on the Court's finding Alaska had a state
mechanism that was "adequate on [its] face" to obtain testing, but which
Osborne had not tried to use.127 The ruling can be seen as an abstention
decision of sorts, in which existing state process was found to adequately
protect the constitutional due process right. 128 Richard Fallon has observed
119. See Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 158-59.
120. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321.
121. Id. at 2336 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 521 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 129
S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Reply to Brief in Opposition, supra note 20, at 8.
126. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 2321 (majority opinion).
128. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 309, 310 (1993) (describing the Court's range
of "avoidance strategies" in the substantive due process area, including use of abstention).
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that the Court often examines the adequacy of state process from a
"managerial" perspective, not focusing on whether the individual claimant
was treated fairly but, rather, whether the state system as a whole is
tolerably fair.129 However, in this case, the Court's findings regarding both
the fairness of Osborne's treatment and the general state process on which
the outcome hinged were quite equivocal.
First, the Court concluded that Osborne "has not tried to use the process
provided to him," and therefore could not challenge the process as applied
to him.' 30 The Court was clear that Osborne need not have exhausted state
process. While the Court at times examines state procedures from a system
perspective, many of the Court's prior due process decisions examine
whether the state applies procedures arbitrarily to a type of situation or in
the manner it handled a given case.131 Indeed, in this case, there was a
vanishing distinction between any state procedures on their face and as
applied. It was in Osborne's individual case that the Alaska court had first
gestured towards any procedures for evaluating postconviction DNA testing
requests, by way of denying Osborne relief. Osborne's claim was that there
was no adequate procedure in Alaska that he could use.
Regardless, the Supreme Court's ruling that Osborne had not used the
procedures in question was based on a finding that Osborne had never
asked for modern STR DNA testing, which was simply incorrect. As noted,
the record before the Court displayed that Osborne had sought modern
DNA testing in state courts and was denied relief.132 Perhaps the Court
instead meant to say not that Osborne did not ask for modern DNA testing,
but that he failed to specifically request modern DNA testing by invoking
the general state newly discovered innocence statute. The majority
concluded, "If he simply seeks the DNA through the State's discovery
procedures, he might well get it." 133 Such a holding would not be factually
erroneous, since Osborne did not in fact invoke that statute. However, as
just described, the state courts had denied Osborne relief finding that he
could not obtain relief under any other statute, such as the Alaska newly
129. Id. at 311.
130. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-12 (1976) (holding that even if
the defendant makes no specific request for material exculpatory evidence to be disclosed,
the prosecution has a duty to produce it); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974)
(requiring that procedures be provided so that a convict's rights at a prisoner disciplinary
hearing are not "arbitrarily abrogated"); see also Newton v. City of N.Y., No. 07 Civ.
6211(SAS), 2010 WL 323050, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2010) (exploring how in Osborne,
the Court found that the applicant had failed to test state procedures, while in other cases the
"Court has recognized that fundamental fairness requires that once a state creates a statutory
right and puts procedures in place to protect that right, those procedures must comport with
due process in application"). The next section discusses several of those cases in greater
detail.
132. See supra note 119.
133. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321.
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discovered evidence statute, nor could he obtain testing using a hypothetical
rule under the Alaska state constitution.
Second, the Court held that the state process was adequate on its face. 134
However, the state had no process that explicitly provided for access to
postconviction DNA testing. To the extent that the state court speculated
that it might recognize such a right, under a general postconviction
discovery statute or the state constitution, it denied relief. No litigant has
ever obtained postconviction DNA testing in Alaska. 135 The state process
consisted entirely of recited reasons for denying Osborne testing.
Thus, Justice Souter agreed with the majority that a narrower procedural
due process approach was appropriate, because "at a general level Alaska
does not deny a right to postconviction testing to prove innocence." 136
Instead, the problem was that "Alaska has presented no good reasons even
on its own terms for denying Osborne the access to the evidence he
seeks."'137 Though the Court does not correct errors in application of state
law, Justice Souter argued that, here, the arbitrary treatment of Osborne's
requests constituted "procedural unfairness" in application of state
process.' 38 After all, the state process was itself defined in the decision that
denied Osborne testing.
If the Alaska courts should have given Osborne DNA testing had he only
asked for it, then following the Court's ruling, perhaps Osborne should now
be able to earn relief from the Alaska state courts. Should Osborne reapply
and again request modern STR testing, perhaps the State would violate his
due process rights by denying him relief. There is another reason why it is
hard to imagine that state courts could continue to deny Osborne DNA
testing. The state courts cannot easily argue that DNA tests could not show
innocence. After all, the state conceded before the Court that DNA testing
could prove Osborne's innocence. 139
Even if the Court's ruling cannot be easily explained factually, the
constitutional right established has legal significance. Under the Court's
test, a litigant may be entitled to DNA testing postconviction having
previously requested new testing from the state courts. The question then
arises whether states may adopt other rationales for limiting DNA testing.
The Court emphasized that states have "flexibility" in crafting such
postconviction statutes. 140  Since the Court ruled that there was no
arbitrariness supposing the State left open an avenue to prove innocence,
134. id. at 2320-21.
135. The majority cited to one case, Patterson v. State, No. A-8814, 2006 WL 573797
(Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2006), in which an Alaska court ordered testing, but it was never
conducted because the evidence was destroyed. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2332-33 n.4
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2340 (Souter, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2342.
138. Id. at 2343.
139. Id. at 2336 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 2320.
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conversely the opinion suggests that it could violate due process to close off
a convict's access to postconviction DNA testing. The Court repeats often
the axiom that due process "is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands."' 141 What does this new
postconviction DNA testing context demand? Those questions are taken up
in the next part.
II. A NEW PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHT AND HERRERA REVISITED
The Osborne Court grappled with the question whether to recognize a
new constitutional right of importance to both civil rights law and
postconviction law. First, the Court recognized a remarkable new
postconviction liberty interest, the first of its kind, a right to access
postconviction DNA testing. Yet the Court left several questions open.
The Court began by explaining that it would not "constitutionalize the
issue" by recognizing an independent constitutional right to postconviction
DNA testing. 142 The Court found that Osborne was not entitled to relief,
having sidestepped available state process. However, the Court ruled
Osborne had "a liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with new
evidence under state law.""14 3 The Court recognized a derivative procedural
due process right arising from state procedures regarding newly discovered
evidence of innocence. The scope of the Osborne procedural due process
right remains undefined, and this part and the next examine its contours.
Second, this part explores implications of the due process right recognized.
Third, this part examines the Court's expansion of a hypothetical
constitutional claim of actual innocence.
A. A New Postconviction Liberty Interest
Despite language espousing unwillingness to take over responsibility for
a new constitutional right, the Osborne court recognized a liberty interest
and a due process right in an area where none had been recognized before.
That feature of the majority opinion makes it all the more enigmatic-and
important. The Court did not recognize a freestanding right to
postconviction DNA testing under all circumstances. Nor did any litigant
or Justice call for an unfettered right of access. All sides agreed that the
Due Process Clause entitles a convict to DNA testing under some
circumstances. The majority simply had a different reading of the facts
raised by Osborne's request, finding that he had not yet pursued available
state remedies. 144 The Court adopted an approach that did not establish an
independent federal right, but rather a derivative right triggered only when a
141. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
142. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2312.
143. Id. at 2319.
144. Id. at 2320-21.
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state adopts postconviction procedures for access to new evidence of
innocence.
Under the Court's procedural due process approach, states retain the
flexibility to decide whether or not to provide an entitlement. If they do,
like Alaska did, and like all states have done, they cannot adopt wholly
inadequate procedures for obtaining access to that entitlement, nor may they
arbitrarily deny access to the entitlement. 145 The Osborne Court's ruling
did not detail what should be drawn from prior procedural due process
precedents, and no prior decision had ever clearly recognized any kind of
due process right during the postconviction process.
The Court cited to Medina v. California146 for the proposition that in the
criminal procedure context, courts should apply a deferential test in which
convicts are entitled to protections arising from traditional notions of
"'fundamental fairness."'' 147  The Medina case dealt with criminal trial
rules, and the Court emphasized that it deferred to the rule in question not
only because of a consensus among the states, but also "because the States
have considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the
criminal process is grounded in centuries of common-law tradition."1 48 The
Medina decision sheds no light on what flexibility states retain when
crafting postconviction statutes. 149
Nor does the "fundamental fairness" language in Medina necessarily
counsel any unusually deferential approach. That language was premised
145. Not only do all states but three have statutes providing access to postconviction
DNA testing, but all states except possibly South Dakota, in which the law is unclear, have
either such a statute or some kind of procedure providing for access to newly discovered
evidence. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 97, at 29 n. 11.
146. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
147. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320-21 (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 446, 448).
148. Medina, 505 U.S. at 445-46.
149. The majority opinion did not apply the Court's decades-old due process test under
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2336 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Osborne had asked that the Court apply the standard of Mathews).
Thus, the Court did not balance the individual interest in obtaining DNA testing against the
State's interest in not providing the testing while taking into consideration the risk of an
erroneous deprivation. The Court's rationale was that, in Medina v. California, the Court
had ruled that the Mathews due process test does not apply to criminal procedure. See
Medina, 505 U.S. at 443. Nor had the Court often applied Mathews in criminal procedure
cases. See Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The
Supreme Court. Search for nterpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 303, 420-21
(2001) ("Although the Supreme Court considered numerous due process challenges to state
criminal procedures in the fifteen-year period between Mathews and Medina v. California, it
utilized the Mathews balancing test in only one of those cases, and its use there was not
debated."). However, the Osborne case was a civil § 1983 complaint. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at
2312. The relief request was in the nature of discovery, and not vacatur of a conviction. Id.
at 2316. In contrast, Medina was a criminal appeal challenging allocation of burdens of
proof at a trial. Medina, 505 U.S. at 439. One advantage of the Mathews analysis is that it
would have forced the majority to articulate what interests were at stake. The majority did
not directly address what Alaska's interest was in denying Osborne the DNA testing. Alaska
itself was not clear.
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on an approach interpreting due process narrowly outside the specific Bill
of Rights guarantees selectively incorporated as against the States.
However, the language in Medina suggesting that the Due Process Clause
has only a narrow or "'limited operation' outside specific Bill of Rights
guarantees belied the vast edifice of the Court's due process
jurisprudence. 150 Though the Court's approach has evolved over time, due
process regulation now extends to all aspects of criminal procedure. 151
Rules originating from the Due Process Clause and not exclusively from
specific Bill of Rights provisions include, for example, rules regulating
eyewitness identification procedures, 152  police interrogations and
voluntariness of confessions,153  defense access to certain expert
evidence, 154 defense access to exculpatory material, 155 prosecution
presentation of false evidence, 156 the ability of the defense to present crucial
witnesses at trial, 157 unfair prosecution closing arguments, 158 and the
obligation of the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.159 The list
goes on and on. The Court's array of freestanding due process decisions
regulate an "extraordinary range" of criminal investigation, charging, trial,
guilty pleas, sentencing, and posttrial procedures. 160 To say that the Court
regulates areas only affected by concerns of fundamental fairness is to say
that the Court regulates almost all aspects of criminal process.
The Osborne Court noted that unlike at the investigative, trial, or
appellate stage, states have "more flexibility" when crafting postconviction
procedures. 16 1  Few rulings address the scope of state postconviction
procedures, which are themselves comparatively recent. While common-
law writs dated back centuries, most states enacted statutory postconviction
rules in the 1970s in part responding to the enlargement of federal habeas
corpus, and to address claims of attorney inadequacy or undisclosed
evidence of innocence not easily asserted during appeals. 162
The Court has held that the State need not provide convicts with counsel
during postconviction procedures. After all, such procedures are
discretionary and need not be made available at all. The Court draws a
150. Medina, 505 U.S. at 443 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352
(1990)).
151. Jerold Israel develops this feature of the Court's due process jurisprudence with
great care and detail. See Israel, supra note 149, at 389-90.
152. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 129 (1977); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
302 (1967).
153. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433-34 (2000).
154. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 86-87 (1985).
155. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432-41 (1995).
156. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935).
157. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
158. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-82 (1986).
159. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).
160. See Israel, supra note 149, at 389.
161. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320 (2009).
162. See Garrett, supra note 9, at 1671.
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sharp line between the criminal appeal and postconviction proceedings that
may follow. After the direct appeal is complete, the conviction is
considered final. Though entitled to "fundamental fairness," convicts have
no right to the assistance of counsel during the civil, collateral
postconviction proceedings that follow. 163 Thus, as the Court explained in
Pennsylvania v. Finley,164 a decision relied upon by the majority in
Osborne, "States have substantial discretion to develop and implement
programs to aid prisoners seeking to secure postconviction review."1 6
5
However, a state's discretion is not unfettered postconviction. In Murray v.
Giarratano,166 the Court ruled that even in a capital case, an inmate lacks
an entitlement to counsel postconviction, but Justice Kennedy, providing
the fifth vote and joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, concurred,
stating that it would be a different matter if a person was to be executed
without representation) 67 Following that concurring opinion, most states
now provide postconviction representation to death row inmates.
168
That a state need not necessarily provide counsel postconviction does not
answer when states must provide access to postconviction evidence, much
less to potentially dispositive evidence of innocence. Providing indigent
convicts with lawyers is expensive and far more burdensome than other
postconviction procedures. Nor does provision of indigent defense
attorneys necessarily enhance the accuracy of outcomes.
The Osborne Court did cite to one case that describes a set of minimally
adequate procedures that might be provided regarding postconviction rights.
The Court cited Wolff v. McDonnell,169 a case regarding procedures for
disciplining prison inmates for misconduct, emphasizing that, though there
was no underlying entitlement to be free from such discipline, minimal
protections must ensure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily
abrogated.' 70 The Court in Wolff stated, "[A] person's liberty is equally
protected, even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the State."'
171
163. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974).
164. 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987).
165. Id. The Osborne dissenters cited to Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), in which
the Court held that though a state need not create appeals as of right, if they do, a convict is
entitled to minimally adequate appellate representation. In Evitts, the Court asked whether
the state provided "an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the
State's appellate process." See id. at 402 (quoting Ross, 417 U.S. at 616). The Court
explained, "when a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant discretionary
elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the Constitution-and, in
particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause." Id. at 401.
166. 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
167. Id. at 14-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168. Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State
Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 1079, 1086 (2006).
169. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
170. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2334 (2009) (citing Wolff, 418
U.S. at 555-56).
171. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. The Osborne majority cited to Connecticut Board of
Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981), for the same proposition. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at
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The Court held in Wolff that prisoners need not be provided with counsel or
a right to cross-examine witnesses during such disciplinary hearings, but
that they were entitled to notice, an opportunity to present documentary
evidence, and a right to obtain discovery, including by taking witness
statements, obtaining documents, and calling witnesses. 172 In that context,
the Court was reluctant to create trial-like procedures "encasing the
disciplinary procedures in an inflexible constitutional straitjacket."'1 73
While requiring that discovery be afforded to the inmate, the right to call
witnesses at the hearing, for example, could be limited if doing so would
"create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority."'1 74
One reading of cases like Wolff is that some significant discovery rights,
including a right to call witnesses and obtain documents, must be provided
when liberty interests are at stake. The liberty interest in Wolff was
arguably more limited, involving imposition of prison discipline, than that
in Osborne, involving postconviction rights to accessing evidence of
innocence that could in turn potentially result in proof of innocence and the
vacatur of the conviction. Wolff rejected certain trial-like procedures,
involving appointment of counsel and cross-examination of witnesses,
while requiring access to discovery, including documents and sometimes
witnesses. A request for access to evidence for DNA testing is far less
intrusive than discovery envisioned in inmate disciplinary proceeding cases.
The Osborne Court did not cite to a series of other decisions regarding
access to evidence in criminal cases. The Court did not cite Griffin v.
Illinois,175 which held that the State must provide a transcript to indigent
criminal appellants who could not afford to buy one if that was the only
way to assure an "adequate and effective" appeal. 176 The Griffin decision is
relevant because it applies to access to discovery of information required to
meaningfully pursue state posttrial (though not postconviction) remedies.
Other cases discuss rights of access to evidence before and during a
criminal trial or before a guilty plea. 177 The Court has said that the defense
right of access to potentially exculpatory evidence is so important that
prosecutors are required to secure such evidence from police.178 After all,
discovery ensures fairness as well as accuracy. Such cases suggest special
reasons to ensure broad access to evidence crucial to a convict's ability to
pursue other state remedies. These omissions from Osborne are troubling
2319 ("'[A] state-created right can, in some circumstances, beget yet other rights to
procedures essential to the realization of the parent right."' (quoting Dumschat, 452 U.S. at
463)).
172. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-72.
173. Id. at 563.
174. Id. at 566.
175. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
176. Id. at20.
177. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5, 244 (1969); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1963).
178. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421 (1995).
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but not surprising. As discussed in the next section, the Court simply failed
to discuss how a fundamental concern with accuracy animates criminal and
postconviction procedure.
Procedural due process precedent suggests that following Osborne, a
state that creates the means to access postconviction DNA testing need not
create elaborate procedures for litigation of the issue but, at the same time,
may not "arbitrarily" deny access to that DNA testing. The Osborne Court
explained that federal courts may intervene if state procedures are
"fundamentally inadequate."' 179  Conversely, minimally adequate
procedures must be provided to permit a convict to apply for postconviction
DNA testing, and, similarly, such procedures must be provided to permit a
convict to challenge a decision denying access to DNA testing. The Court
indicated that Alaska's procedures satisfied the due process test because
they did provide access to inmates like Osborne; Osborne had simply not
asked for the DNA testing he sought. 180 The Court noted other features of
Alaska procedure that made it adequate, including that such claims are
exempt from time limits that would otherwise apply. 181 Thus, the Osborne
right may have some significance if states categorically deny access to
DNA testing or provide inadequate procedures, as in Wolff for ensuring
access to evidence in the State's custody. Such applications of Osborne are
taken up next.
B. Future Development of the Osborne Liberty Interest
Despite language indicating intent not to constitutionalize the area, the
decision in Osborne recognizes a broad procedural due process right. On
the one hand, such a derivative right imposes no obligation on states that
provide no avenue at all for postconviction DNA testing. 182 On the other
hand, almost all states do provide for postconviction testing, and still others
provide for general postconviction access to discovery. 183 Constitutional
questions will be raised in those states, both states that do have avenues
available for postconviction DNA testing and those that have more general
postconviction discovery statutes. The Court avoided answering such
questions because Osborne's case, in which he supposedly did not ask state
courts for the testing he sought, did not raise those issues. Future cases will
raise those issues.
179. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320 (2009).
180. Id. at 2321.
181. Id. at 2320.
182. The Court made an unusual point that Alaska considered passing its own
postconviction DNA testing statute. See id. at 2316. The Osborne decision does not appear
intended to give Alaska any incentive to pass or not pass such a statute.
183. Indeed, as the Court noted, three of the four jurisdictions that do not have specific
postconviction DNA testing statutes have had courts indicate that postconviction requests
may be granted pursuant to general provisions. Id. at 2317; see also supra note 104.
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Language in the majority opinion suggested that a broader ruling would
raise the spectre of technology run amok: the power of DNA must be
harnessed to avoid "unnecessarily overthrowing the established system of
criminal justice."' 184 How could DNA technology overthrow our criminal
justice system? As the opinion otherwise recognizes, DNA testing is used
in tens of thousands of cases each year precisely to serve the goals of the
criminal justice system, expediting the process of securing convictions
when used to identify culprits. 185 In a small minority of cases, numbering
in the hundreds, DNA evidence excludes and proves innocence
postconviction. The statement suggesting that those comparatively few
cases might "overthrow" the system 186 is hyperbolic if not insensitive, and
runs contrary to statements in the opinion recognizing the law enforcement
significance of DNA testing. Chief Justice Roberts elaborated that states
enacted mechanisms to channel the power of DNA into established
procedures. Citing to my work surveying state statutes, he noted that states
permit postconviction motions seeking DNA testing, but often require that
the testing be material to the convict's case.1 87 Some state statutes require
diligence in seeking the testing, or require that the testing have been
technologically impossible at trial, and some even exclude persons who
pleaded guilty. The question then arises what the Osborne due process
right means when applicants are denied relief under such statutes.
The narrow interpretation of the decision is that the due process scrutiny
Osborne commands is so lax that just about any state procedure providing
some access to postconviction DNA testing or discovery will be found
constitutional. After all, the decision held that Alaska's ill-defined process
was constitutionally adequate. On one view, Alaska has absolutely no
clearly defined standard, or at least none that was applied in any clear
fashion in Osborne's case. Alaska makes postconviction DNA testing
available only under a hypothetical test drawn from other states, or
alternatively under a general postconviction statute that does not speak to
DNA testing. Under that reading, Osborne permits a state to adopt a
procedure in name only. States would retain almost unfettered flexibility to
craft postconviction statutes that do not meaningfully provide access to
DNA testing.
That narrow interpretation conflicts with the Court's understanding of
Alaska's procedures. The Court described Alaska's procedures as
providing a fairly broad avenue for postconviction DNA testing. The Court
emphasized that the Alaska procedures lacked time limits and merely
required that the DNA testing was "diligently pursued" and "sufficiently
material."' 188 The Court approved the state procedure only by interpreting it
184. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2316.
185. Id. at 2328-29.
186. Id. at 2316; see supra note 102.
187. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2316-17 (citing Garrett, supra note 9, at 1719).
188. Id. at 2320.
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to provide broad access to DNA testing under clear criteria. Indeed, the
Court recommended that Osborne seek relief under those very procedures.
Adopting a cramped reading of Osborne, one could discount that
language as the Court's attempt to disguise the true meaning of the
decision-that the Court recognized a right without any meaningful
remedy, because a state statute providing even the most insurmountable
obstacles to accessing the provided DNA testing will satisfy the due process
test. Such a reading ignores the Court's stated legal basis for its ruling. A
related argument could recognize that the Court was willing to rely on
equivocal findings to serve as the basis for denying Osborne relief. The
Court might similarly view the record in future due process cases.
Additional support for the interpretation that Osborne permits even
highly restrictive state postconviction procedures is that the majority
approach never mentions accuracy as a central concern in the Court's
criminal procedure jurisprudence of fundamental fairness. Indeed, the
majority makes a point of stating that some error is tolerable. The Court
states that although our criminal system is "time-tested" it "cannot be
perfect" and is "not flawless."1 89  The Court has time and time again
described as perhaps the central objective of our criminal justice system that
"the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free" 190 and that a "concern
about the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person
has long been at the core of our criminal justice system."' 91 The Court
adopts or rejects criminal procedure protections citing to concerns regarding
accuracy, including due process protections to ensure that unreliable
evidence is not presented to a jury at trial. Examples include rules
regulating eyewitness identifications, confessions, defense access to expert
assistance, and defense access to exculpatory evidence. 192 Further, the
Court adopted the protection that a conviction be reversed if there was not
sufficient evidence such that a jury could have convicted beyond a
reasonable doubt on all elements of the crime. 193 In the postconviction
context, the Court has adopted exceptions to otherwise restrictive habeas
corpus procedures if a compelling showing of innocence is made. 194 Thus,
the Herrera plurality cited to the series of celebrated constitutional
protections ensuring against wrongful convictions, but noted, "'Due process
does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to
eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person."' 195 The step
189. Id. at 2323.
190. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975); see also Portuondo v. Agard, 529
U.S. 61, 73 (2000); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
191. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995).
192. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
193. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979).
194. For a taxonomy of innocence-related postconviction standards, see Garrett, supra
note 9, pt. llD.
195. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993) (alteration in original) (quoting
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977)).
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requested by Osborne posed no cost and could potentially uncover a false
conviction, and, if so, it could identify an unpunished perpetrator, but the
Osborne majority failed to develop the core criminal justice concern with
accuracy.
All of these arguments, despite some merit, overstate the degree to which
the Court failed to conduct robust due process scrutiny. I argue that one
must accept the Osborne Court's holding on its face, as future courts are
obligated to do. The Court recognized a due process right and defined its
broad contours. The Court's prior procedural due process jurisprudence
will also inform the inquiry that lower courts must conduct. Further, far
from merely gesturing towards due process, the Court described in broad-
brush form what a minimally adequate state statute provides.
State statutes can reasonably require that the evidence "must indeed be
newly available," "must have been diligently pursued, and must also be
sufficiently material.' ' 196 Most critical, the Court cited to the standard in the
federal statute providing access to postconviction DNA testing sought by
federal prisoners. The federal statute, enacted pursuant to the Innocence
Protection Act, provides a sensible model for a nonarbitrary statute.
Indeed, the Court noted that "[a]t oral argument, Osborne agreed that the
federal statute is a model for how States ought to handle the issue." 197 That
statute ensures that DNA testing be provided to convicts who can show that
the testing could "raise a reasonable probability that the applicant did not
commit the offense."' 198
The Osborne decision can be seen as ratifying the federal Innocence
Protection Act model. Many states have sensible and broad DNA access
laws that provide access to postconviction DNA testing to those who could
plausibly prove their innocence. Still other states have statutes that ensure
access to non-DNA postconviction discovery that could shed light on
claims or on the issue of innocence. In contrast, statutes in some states that
do not grant discovery or testing to those who could reasonably prove
innocence may be vulnerable to due process challenges. In a series of
states, the Osborne ruling could trigger successful challenges to restrictions
on access to postconviction discovery or DNA testing.
For example, some states arbitrarily exclude subcategories of prisoners
entirely from access to postconviction DNA testing. Take a compelling
example: Kentucky and Nevada limit access to postconviction DNA testing
to capital cases. 199 A prisoner not sentenced to death would have a strong
claim that such a distinction is arbitrary. Such a prisoner would have no
meaningful state avenue for relief. The Osborne Court never suggested that
196. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320-21 (2009) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3600(a) (2006)).
197. Id. at 2316-17.
198. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8)(B).
199. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 422.285(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 29-4116 to -4125(1) (2008).
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any such categorical exclusion from testing could be valid. Further, the
Court has often suggested that distinctions should not be drawn between
capital and noncapital cases postconviction, stating, for example, that "we
have 'refused to hold that the fact that a death sentence has been imposed
requires a different standard of review on federal habeas corpus."' 200
Similarly, several states require that the issue of identity has been
litigated at trial, which five states' courts interpret to bar relief to convicts
who did not have a trial but pleaded guilty. 201 A state might argue that
DNA testing would serve no purpose because no person would ever admit
guilt falsely. However, we know that in fact individuals do falsely confess.
Indeed, sixteen convicts who had pleaded guilty have been exonerated by
postconviction DNA testing, and forty-two exonerees had confessed their
guilt, albeit falsely.20 2 The Osborne majority, quite importantly, did not
rely on any rationale that evidence of guilt should preclude access to
testing. The majority noted the fact that he had confessed at a parole
hearing in the background section of the opinion. The Court never
discussed that event or referred in any other way to Osborne's likely guilt in
the discussion of the contours of the due process right.
The type of due process scrutiny envisioned by the Court becomes clear
when one compares the concurring opinion authored by Justice Alito, who
would have upheld the Alaska statute for very different reasons. It was
only Justice Alito who emphasized unrelated evidence of guilt, noting that
"[a]fter conviction, in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain parole, respondent
confessed in detail to the crime." 20 3 Of course, if Osborne was innocent, he
certainly could have known the details of his case-he could have
confessed "in detail" based on what he heard at his own trial. 204
Following Osborne, statutes may be vulnerable to due process challenges
if they rely on distinctions premised on harmless error reasoning that trial
evidence of guilt, or posttrial evidence for that matter, should preclude
access to scientific evidence of innocence. 20 5  For example, in
Pennsylvania, courts have dismissed requests for DNA testing by persons
who had confessed, ruling that such a person cannot assert his innocence. 20 6
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently confronted such a
200. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 405 (quoting Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9 (1989)).
201. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 97, at 6 & n.1; Garrett, supra note 9, at
1680-81.
202. See Garrett, supra note 110, at 115.
203. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2324 (2009) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
204. See supra note 110.
205. Justice Stevens emphasized that courts are not necessarily good at assessing
innocence postconviction, citing my study developing this point. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct at
2337 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Garrett, supra note 18, at 109).
206. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Young, 2005 PA Super. 1428, 10, 73 A.2d 720, 727.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted an appeal on whether a confession bars access to
postconviction DNA testing. Commonwealth v. Wright, 951 A.2d 263, 263 (Pa. 2008).
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case, misinterpreting Osborne to rule out a due process right, but dismissing
the complaint because it missed a state statute of limitations, not based on
the merits.207 Should such a case be reached on the merits, a regime
denying DNA testing merely because the convict confessed or pleaded
guilty should be found arbitrary and a denial of due process.
A final set of statutes require due diligence in seeking DNA testing at
trial or that the technology not have been available at trial. The concern is
that the convict might fail to request DNA testing at trial for tactical
reasons. Yet, the Osborne majority did not suggest that such a state interest
could be interposed to bar access to postconviction DNA testing. It is the
concurring opinion by Justice Alito that argued that Osborne should be
"bound by his attorney's tactical decisions" if the attorney "declines the
opportunity to perform DNA testing at trial for tactical reasons." 20 8 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit opinion claiming that Osborne
established no right under the Due Process Clause involved a Colorado
statute barring DNA testing unless trial counsel had a justifiable excuse or
engaged in ineffective assistance.20 9 In that case, the convict's lawyer
failed to seek DNA testing at trial, apparently for strategic reasons, as
perhaps Osborne's lawyer did.210 Yet the DNA tests could unequivocally
prove innocence. Following Osborne, it is not clear that a state can
reasonably attribute the attorney's decision to the client. If there is anything
that DNA exonerations have taught us, it is that many actually innocent
individuals fail to understand the significance of DNA testing, fail to claim
their innocence at trial, and fail to obtain DNA testing, often because of
inadequate legal representation, only to prove their innocence years later.211
The state has primary custody of the evidence, and a decision by the state
not to itself conduct DNA testing is highly suspect. Further, there may be
sound reasons for trial attorneys not to seek DNA testing where the state
does not do so. They may rely on the state's representation that testing
would not be probative or that insufficient evidence exists to test. In
addition, courts often do not fund access to independent experts or testing,
but rather, as Erin Murphy argues, make "the government not only the party
able to obtain and then seclude such evidence, but often also grant[] it total
control over the mechanisms of analysis." 212
207. Young v. Phila. County Dist. Attorney's Office, 341 F. App'x 843, 845 (3d Cir.
2009).
208. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2324, 2330 (Alito, J., concurring).
209. McDaniel v. Suthers, 335 F. App'x 734, 735-36 (10th Cir. 2009).
210. Id. at 735.
211. See Garrett, supra note 9, pt. II.B (presenting data concerning the one quarter of
DNA exonerees for whom DNA testing existed at the time of trial); Garrett, supra note 18,
pt. II.B.5 (presenting data concerning litigation of claims of innocence by persons after
exonerated by DNA testing).
212. Erin Murphy, Inferences, Arguments, and Second Generation Forensic Evidence, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1047, 1067 (2008).
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Most states adopt requirements that the DNA testing be potentially
probative of innocence. Such a standard certainly makes sense. For
example, DNA testing would serve no useful purpose in a case where the
convict still concedes that he had sexual intercourse with the victim, but
maintains that there was consent. However, some state courts have adopted
strained interpretations of materiality requirements. They rule, for example,
that because the test results could conceivably match a consensual partner
that there is no reason to conduct the testing. 213  Such rulings make no
sense. The testing could establish the identity of the culprit. Additional
testing could also tell one whether the results merely identified a consensual
partner. Such speculative rationales may be open to challenge as arbitrary.
Indeed, challenges to such rulings have particular merit after Osborne,
because such a convict is within the group to which the State claims to
provide the entitlement, yet the state court nevertheless arbitrarily denies
relief. On the other hand, at least one court has adopted the interpretation
that I reject: that because the Osborne inquiry focuses on whether the state
process is adequate on its face, no inquiry at all is necessary into whether
the individual reasons for denying relief were valid.214 The Court in
Osborne did inquire into the state courts' reasons for denying relief, as well
as the adequacy of the state process.
If courts interpret state materiality requirements in an arbitrary fashion,
then they should be subject to due process scrutiny. They have adopted a
process permitting courts to deny DNA testing based on unsupported
speculation to those who could reasonably prove innocence. Similarly,
rulings that simply conclude, without explanation, that testing could not be
probative of innocence, may also be open to challenge as arbitrary. A
related factual scenario was raised in a decision that the Ninth Circuit
recently affinned.215 The district court denied relief, arguing that an inmate
could not reasonably show innocence through a DNA test of two crime
scene hairs found by the victim's body. Those hairs were not introduced at
trial as evidence of guilt. Nor were they clearly tied to the perpetrator. The
hairs could have come from another visitor to the victim's home. Yet
should those hairs be identified as not coming from the convict, but as
matching another person with no innocent explanation for being in the
victim's home, the test results would raise a "reasonable probability" of a
different outcome. 216 The court did not clearly explain why it assumed that
this testing could not create "an opportunity to exonerate him. '217
213. See Garrett, supra note 9, pt. II.C.3.b.
214. Cunningham v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 592 F.3d 1237, 1266 (1 1th Cir. 2010) ("It is
essential to Cunningham's argument that this Court find Alabama's process inadequate on its
face, not just as it might apply to his particular case, because only then can his failure to
properly pursue state-law remedies be excused.").
215. Harrison v. Dumanis, 343 F. App'x 218 (9th Cir. 2009).
216. Harrison v. Dumanis, No. 06cv2470-RLH, 2007 WL 1159976, *7-8 (S.D. Cal. Apr.
18, 2007), aff'd, 343 F. App'x 218 (9th Cir. 2009).
217. Id.
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One last argument deserves mention because it provides a second place
in the Osborne opinions where Justices misunderstood applicable scientific
principles. Justice Alito, concurring and joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, cited to several valid but very much misplaced concerns regarding
accuracy of DNA testing in cases involving contaminated or degraded
biological samples. The concurring opinion suggests that a State might
always retain some residual interest in denying DNA testing because the
results can fail "to provide 'absolute proof of anything." 218 Indeed, the
concurring opinion displayed real confusion about the science of DNA
testing. In particular, the opinion confused the probative value of an
exclusion with that of an inclusion. The opinion quotes from an article by
Erin Murphy, which had made very clear at the outset that an exclusion has
far greater probative value than an inclusion: "When a genetic profile is
generated, it is far easier to determine with confidence those individuals
from whom the sample could not have come than to identify with certainty
the individual to whom the sample absolutely belongs." 219
To take a simple example, conventional ABO blood typing did not have
great probative power if the results included a suspect. Suppose the
evidence and the suspect had an 0 blood type-so does about forty percent
of the population. Yet ABO blood typing could be definitive if it excluded
a suspect. If the evidence was known to have originated from the
perpetrator and displayed B blood group substances, while the defendant
had the A type, then the defendant could be excluded. Similarly, even
partial or degraded DNA evidence might very well contain more than
enough information to exclude a person and support innocence. Such
partial DNA evidence might not be capable of including a person with any
significant probative power. Thus, Justice Alito, perhaps unintentionally,
raised important concerns largely irrelevant in the exoneration context, but
highly salient when defendants challenge DNA testing that prosecutors far
more commonly use to support a case for guilt.
C. An Expanded but Hypothetical Actual Innocence Right
The elephant standing in the Justices' chambers was the question whether
to recognize a federal constitutional right to relief based on a showing of
actual innocence. If so, Osborne could be entitled to discovery that would
help him vindicate such a right. For seventeen years since Herrera was
decided in 1993, the federal courts have operated under what Justice Scalia
called "a strange regime" assuming that an actual innocence claim exists,
but unsure of its status or context. 220 The plurality in Herrera did not reach
218. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2324, 2327 (2009) (Atito, J.,
concurring) (quoting id. at 2337 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
219. Erin Murphy, The Art in the Science of DNA: A Layperson's Guide to the
Subjectivity Inherent in Forensic DNA Typing, 58 EMORY L.J. 489, 493 (2008).
220. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,429 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the question. A majority of the Justices stated they would recognize such a
claim of actual innocence, but some declined to do so in that case, citing to
Herrera's weak showing of his innocence.221 The Court maintained that
stance in its 2006 House decision by again assuming that such a right might
exist, but suggesting the standard would be quite high to prevail on a claim
of actual innocence.222
Following the same evasive approach, the Osborne majority noted that
"[i]n this case too we can assume without deciding that such a claim
exists," because Osborne did not assert such a claim in a habeas petition.223
The opinion notes that such an actual innocence claim could then support a
request for discovery, which is available "for good cause" under the federal
rules governing habeas petitions.224  Justice Alito, in his concurring
opinion, echoed this point, recommending that Osborne should assert such a
claim in a habeas petition.225
The Osborne decision gives far greater weight to litigation of innocence,
including claims of innocence in habeas petitions. That is because, for the
first time, a due process actual innocence claim assumed to exist for the
sake of argument in Herrera and House-which were both death penalty
cases-now was assumed to exist in a noncapital case. This aspect of
Osborne, not highlighted in the Justices' opinions, may be the most
significant. A far broader class of convicts may now assert such innocence
claims. To be sure, no convict has ever obtained relief under such a claim,
which, because it is only assumed to exist, has no settled standard for
obtaining relief.226 However, the Court made it clear that federal district
courts have authority to entertain actual innocence claims, and may order
postconviction DNA testing as part of discovery relevant to such claims or
to other constitutional claims. 227
Indeed, the Alaska court did not just rely on state law, but contended that
the U.S. Supreme Court would be unlikely to recognize a federal due
process right to postconviction DNA testing or to claim actual innocence. 228
With the Supreme Court continuing to assume the existence of such an
actual innocence right, lower federal courts and states may be encouraged to
continue to entertain and factually develop claims of actual innocence. The
Court added further weight to such claims by recently granting its first
original habeas petition in decades in the case of Troy Davis, a capital case,
221. Id. at 419, 421 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that "the proper disposition of
this case is neither difficult nor troubling" where the record "overwhelmingly demonstrates"
petitioner's guilt).
222. 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006).
223. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321.
224. Id. at 2322.
225. Id. at 2329-30 (Alito, J., concurring).
226. See Garrett, supra note 9, at 1691.
227. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2322.
228. Osborne v. State (Osborne 1), 110 P.3d 986, 994 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
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and sending the petition to the district court for evaluation of his claim of
actual innocence. 229
I1. OUTLIERS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. The Eclipse of Finality
The Osborne Court emphasized that not only are states "actively
confronting the challenges DNA technology poses to our criminal justice
systems," but also how DNA technology challenges "our traditional notions
of finality. '230 What is perhaps most significant about that passage and
then the opinion is that the Court said so little about finality, seeming to
acknowledge that finality is less of a concern in the DNA era. Finality
refers to the State's interest in repose after entering a final conviction. The
concern with finality was expressed in statutes barring postconviction
litigation based on new evidence of innocence after limitations periods had
expired. State postconviction rules adopted chiefly beginning in the 1970s
restricted efforts to raise new trial motions and newly discovered evidence
of innocence. 231
The concept of finality played a pivotal role in the recent history of
federal habeas corpus, but in the area of postconviction DNA testing,
finality has all but disappeared as a state concern. Drawing on national
consensus, in Herrera, the Court noted that a reason not to recognize a right
to claim actual innocence was that "[o]nly 15 States allow a new trial
motion based on newly discovered evidence to be filed more than three
years after conviction." 232 Although at times the Osborne decision reads as
if tracking the language of the majority opinion in Herrera (including by
citing Medina),233 the finality-based underpinnings of Herrera had
completely eroded, and the same reasoning could not apply.
Due to the advent of DNA testing, forty-nine of the fifty states now
provide at least one, and sometimes more than one, mechanism by which a
prisoner may seek relief based on evidence of innocence-such as a
favorable DNA test result-even after the ordinarily applicable time limits
have expired. 234 Alaska has also disclaimed an interest in finality. The
state permits a motion made at any time regarding newly discovered
evidence of innocence, though it does not provide a separate right to access
and test evidence in the custody of the state.
229. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009).
230. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2322.
231. See Garrett, supra note 9, at 1660-84.
232. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411 (1993).
233. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320; Herrera, 506 U.S. at 407-08.
234. The law in the last state, South Dakota, remains unclear but suggests at least that
such a right exists. See Jenner v. Dooley, 1999 SD 20, 17-19, 590 N.W.2d 463, 471
(stating that "courts should solemnly consider reopening a case if a 'truly persuasive'
showing of actual innocence lies close at hand" (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417)).
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Why have state rules of finality evaporated? The concern with finality
was firmly joined to a concern with accuracy. States barred new trial
motions made years after a conviction because traditional evidence became
far less reliable over time. As the plurality put it in Herrera, "the passage
of time only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications" due to
"'erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses.' 235 The trial is the more
accurate test of the evidence. DNA "challenges" all of those traditional
assumptions because it can provide evidence far more accurate than the
memory of a witness or a conventional forensic analysis, and it can do so
years or decades later. When finality no longer served the interest in
accuracy, accuracy prevailed and the states upended postconviction statutes
of limitations.
One finer procedural point related to § 1983 doctrine explains an oddity
in the opinion. Relying on finality would have been particularly misplaced
in the Osborne case, because as the Court noted, Osborne was not directly
attacking his conviction, and therefore did not need to exhaust state
procedures to obtain relief under § 1983.236 Under the doctrine of Heck,
one may not challenge one's conviction by filing a civil claim.237 The
majority assumed for the purposes of this decision that Osborne satisfied
the Heck requirements (however, the Court has just stayed an execution in a
case squarely raising the question whether Heck bars a § 1983 complaint
seeking postconviction DNA testing). 238 As a formal matter, the complaint
does not seek to invalidate a conviction. Osborne "must bring an entirely
separate suit or a petition for clemency to invalidate his conviction." 239 If
not challenging a final conviction, finality is only hypothetically implicated.
If Alaska values finality over accuracy, then state courts could deny a
vacatur and the Governor can refuse a pardon even if DNA test results
exclude Osborne.240 For all of those reasons, the majority could not insist
on any strong state interest in finality.
B. Rewarding the Outlier?
While the Court recognized a groundbreaking constitutional right, it
discussed as a special reason for exercising caution in the area the fact that
"[s]tates are actively confronting the challenges [of] DNA technology" by
enacting statutes providing for access to testing postconviction and that
action from the Court might "short-circuit what looks to be a prompt and
235. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403-04 (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491
(1991)).
236. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321.
237. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 (1994).
238. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2319; see Skinner v. Switzer, No. 09-9000 (09A743), 2010
WL 1133880 (Mar. 24, 2010).
239. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2318.
240. After all, several DNA exonerees were initially denied relief even after DNA testing
excluded them. See Garrett, supra note 18, pt. II.C. 1.
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considered legislative response." 241  The Court then did just that, and
constitutionalized the area by reaffirming a due process interest contingent
on existence of inadequate state-created process.
Nor were states particularly "prompt." For more than a decade after
DNA testing was first used postconviction in 1989, New York and Illinois
had adopted the only statutes providing for access to testing
postconviction.242 Only in the last decade did almost all remaining states
pass statutes, many in just the past five years. Alaska, however, "is one of a
handful of States yet to enact legislation. '243
What made the Court's discussion remarkable was the suggestion that
consensus among the states counseled against recognizing or further
defining a right, rather than in favor of doing so. Michael Klarman has
explored how "the Justices seem least reluctant to expand constitutional
rights when doing so involves simply holding a few outlier states to the
norm already espoused by the vast majority. ' 244 Obviously, the Court
intrudes far more on the states if it invalidates widely held practices.
Klarman notes, for example, "Griswold required the Court to invalidate the
laws of only two states and almost certainly was consistent with dominant
national opinion. Roe, on the other hand, had the effect of invalidating the
abortion laws of forty-six states and has been intensely controversial ever
since. '245 Consistent with that theory, the Court has repeatedly emphasized
consensus among the states. In Stanford v. Kentucky,246 the Court stated
that "the primary and most reliable indication of [a national] consensus
is ... the pattern of enacted laws."'2 47 In Loving v. Virginia,248 the Court
noted that only sixteen states had antimiscegenation statutes. 249 More
recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,250 the Court noted Texas was one of few
states that still criminalized same-sex sodomy.251
The Court also tracks national consensus and regulates outliers in the
area of criminal procedure, in which the Court is especially sensitive to
concerns of federalism and comity. As Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker
explain, "the wholesale criminal procedure revolution wrought by the
Warren Court in the 1960s was in large part an attempt to bring outliers-
241. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2322.
242. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
243. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2317.
244. Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 48, 63 (2000) [hereinafter Klarman, Racial Origins]; see also Michael J. Klarman,
Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1996);
Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145,
172-73 (1998).
245. Klarman, Racial Origins, supra note 244, at 53.
246. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
247. Id. at 373.
248. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
249. Id. at 6 n.5.
250. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
251. Id. at 568-73.
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again, mostly southern states-up to a national standard of due process in
criminal cases." 252  Much of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence is
concerned with practices in a relatively small number of states. For
example, in Atkins v. Virginia,253 the majority emphasized not only "the
number of these States" prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, but
also "the consistency of the direction of change" and the rare incidence of
executions of the mentally retarded in states that do not prohibit it.
254
Similarly, the Court's 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons255 relied on the
fact that "30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty. '256 In the 2008-2009
Term, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,257 the Court cited to
"widespread practices" in the states concerning confrontation of forensic
reports, 258 while the dissent argued that the Court was overturning the rule
in thirty-five states. 259
Another line of Supreme Court decisions emphasizes not national
consensus, but rather a long-standing tradition protecting a right. The Court
in substantive due process decisions like Washington v. Glucksberg260 has
refused to recognize rights that would have upended the long-standing
practices of the vast majority of the states.261 In the area of substantive due
process, tradition is particularly salient, for the Court examines whether the
conduct is so far outside the bounds of long-accepted behavior as to "shock
the conscience." 262  That the Osborne Court rejected a substantive due
process theory of entitlement to postconviction DNA testing was no
surprise. The Court, as in the past, stated reluctance "to expand the concept
of substantive due process" and cited to the novelty of Osborne's claim.
263
In the criminal procedure context, the Court's approach has been mixed,
often emphasizing current consensus, but at other times emphasizing
tradition, and not always making clear whether a right established is a
substantive or procedural due process right. The Court frequently discusses
current consensus in the states when evaluating due process claims, though
also heavily emphasizing historical practice, and noting at times, "This is
not to say that either history or current practice is dispositive." 264 Consider
252. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of the
Death Penalty in "Executing" Versus "Symbolic" States in the United States, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 1869, 1916(2006).
253. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
254. Id. at 315-16.
255. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
256. Id. at 564.
257. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
258. Id. at 2541.
259. Id. at 2555 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
260. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
261. Id. at 702.
262. Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998).
263. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2322 (2009) (citing Collins v.
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
264. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 642 (1991); see Israel, supra note 149, at 413-14.
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Medina, the case from which the Osborne majority drew. There, the Court
stated that it considered whether the challenged procedure was consistent
with "[c]ontemporary practice," before turning to whether it "transgresses
any recognized principle of 'fundamental fairness' in operation." 265
Particularly relevant to the claim Osborne raised, in Herrera the Court
noted that "[o]nly 15 States allow a new trial motion based on newly
discovered evidence to be filed more than three years after conviction." 266
Now that such statutes have almost entirely been displaced, there is a strong
argument that not only should the Court recognize a constitutional claim for
access to postconviction DNA testing, but also to relief based on a showing
of actual innocence. 267
The Court in Osborne claimed the opposite rationale, that state consensus
counseled against further intervention. The majority suggested that a ruling
for Osborne could somehow "cast these statutes into constitutional doubt
and be forced to take over the issue of DNA access ourselves. '268 The
majority also cited to Washington. v. Glucksberg for the proposition that the
Court "'must therefore exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to
break new ground"' and also that the states "'are currently engaged in
serious, thoughtful examinations.' 269 Such a rationale makes little sense
on its face or against the backdrop of the Court's jurisprudence. If only a
handful of states had postconviction DNA testing statutes, and the others
were in the process of considering such statutes, then the concern with
interfering in that process would have made some sense. Chief Judge J.
Harvie Wilkinson first made the argument that states should be free to
experiment in the area in Harvey v. Horan.270 But Judge Wilkinson's
opinion was written in 2002, when only half of the states had adopted DNA
access statutes, and one could fairly say that the states were still divided and
experimenting. 271 Now that almost all states have enacted DNA access
statutes, the concern has vanished. Instead, a ruling providing DNA testing
to Osborne or recognizing a freestanding entitlement to DNA testing would
affect Alaska, an aberrational outlier, and perhaps other states that adopt
arbitrary restrictions on postconviction DNA testing. The dissent noted,
"The fact that nearly all the States have now recognized some
postconviction right to DNA evidence makes it more, not less, appropriate
to recognize a limited federal right to such evidence in cases where litigants
are unfairly barred from obtaining relief in state court. '272 The Osborne
265. Israel, supra note 149, at 447-48 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342,
352 (1990)).
266. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411 (1993).
267. See Garrett, supra note 9, at 1699-716.
268. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2322.
269. Id. at 2316, 2322 (quoting Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20
(1997)).
270. 285 F.3d 298, 300-01 (4th Cir. 2002).
271. See Garrett, supra note 9, app.
272. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2335 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2956 [Vol. 78
DNA AND DUE PROCESS
majority never explained how a freestanding fight to postconviction DNA
testing would substantially disrupt state practice.
The Court's rhetoric about deference to state experimentation was also
puzzling, because the Osborne due process interest provides grounds to
challenge arbitrary denial of access to postconviction DNA testing. As
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, "a decision to recognize a limited right
of postconviction access to DNA testing would not prevent the States from
creating procedures by which litigants request and obtain such access; it
would merely ensure that States do so in a manner that is nonarbitrary." 273
That due process right may cement the existing national consensus, while
reigning in outlier states that persist in denying DNA testing to those who
could prove innocence. 274
C. Recognizing New Constitutional Rights
The Osborne Court used strong language affirming its unwillingness to
"constitutionalize" the postconviction DNA testing field. The majority
framed the question "whether the Federal Judiciary must leap ahead-
revising (or even discarding) the system [of criminal justice as it now
exists] by creating a new constitutional right and taking over responsibility
for refining it."' 275 The majority stated that recognizing a postconviction
fight would "force us to act as policymakers." 276 Similarly, Justice Alito in
his concurring opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, discussed
the need to avoid "wielding the blunt instrument of due process, to
interfere" with state and federal regulation.277 The Court did recognize a
liberty interest in state postconviction process, including access rights to
DNA testing. Yet the Court tiptoed around the claim, making every effort
to construe (or disregard) facts to avoid vindication of that liberty interest in
this case. Similarly, the Court avoided reaching, but assumed the existence
of, an actual innocence right. Finally, the Court did not carefully define the
boundaries of the procedural due process right it recognized. That language
expressed a temperamental unwillingness by many of the Justices to
develop new constitutional rights. Chief Justice Roberts offered similar
reasons in the Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v.
Holder278 decision upholding the Voting Rights Act by narrowly
interpreting the statute to avoid a constitutional ruling. 279 In this case,
Roberts noted how the Justices remain "keenly mindful of our institutional
273. Id. at 2339.
274. Indeed, Alaska may itself enact postconviction DNA access legislation. See Jeremy
Hsieh, Sen. French: DNA Bill Should Mimic Federal Law, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Apr. 4, 2010,
http://juneauempire.comstories/040410/sta_601760153.shtml.
275. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2323.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 2329 (Alito, J., concurring).
278. 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
279. Id.
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role" and ended the decision by stating that "[w]hether conditions continue
to justify such legislation is a difficult constitutional question we do not
answer today." 280
Similarly, in Osborne, the Court was willing to leave important questions
to be answered on another day. Justice Souter's dissent sounded those
themes at greater length in several moving passages. Justice Souter lauded
the virtues of cautious work when recognizing "an individual right
unsanctioned by tradition." 281 He agreed that "the beginning of wisdom is
to go slow" and added, "[T]he accumulation of new empirical knowledge
can turn yesterday's reasonable range of the government's options into a
due process anomaly over time." 282 He elaborated,
Changes in societal understanding of the fundamental reasonableness of
government actions work out in much the same way that individuals
reconsider issues of fundamental belief. We can change our own
inherited views just so fast, and a person is not labeled a stick-in-the-mud
for refusing to endorse a new moral claim without having some time to
work through it intellectually and emotionally. 283
The passage endorsing an incremental approach provides a fitting bookend
to Souter's years on the Court-particularly because he emphasized that
there were limits to his patience. He argued that although the Court should
usually go slow, Osborne had tried every avenue to obtain DNA testing that
could prove his innocence. Osborne had waited long enough for justice.
The going slow (or standing still) approach has characterized the Court's
innocence jurisprudence. The Court has yet to decide, but has long
assumed arguendo that a capital convict can secure relief based on a
showing of actual innocence. For seventeen years, the Court has repeatedly
avoided deciding whether such a claim exists, much less defining its scope.
Again in Osborne, the Court assumed an actual innocence right might exist,
but without defining the right.
Outside of the innocence context, the Court has often proceeded more
quickly. Several areas of criminal procedure have been marked by recent
and dramatic change, such as in the landmark death penalty rulings in
Atkins and Roper,284 the Confrontation Clause ruling in Crawford v.
Washington,285 and the sentencing decisions following Apprendi v. New
Jersey.286 In the 2008-2009 Term, the Court in Melendez-Diaz, found that
a convict's confrontation right to challenge forensic analysis was
violated. 287 The right asserted was a Sixth Amendment Confrontation
280. Id. at 2513, 2516.
281. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2340 (Souter, J., dissenting).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 2341.
284. See supra Part III.B.
285. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
286. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
287. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
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Clause right grounded in the not particularly long-established Crawford line
of cases. Outside the criminal procedure area, but also faced with the
assertion of a brand new due process right the same Term, in Caperton v.
A. T. Massey Coal,288 the Court established a right to obtain the recusal of a
judge given an undue probability of bias based on campaign donations and
conceded that the context of judicial campaigns was "not presented in the
precedents." 289 Did Osborne fare as well? He obtained no relief from the
Court. In a way he did achieve something, though, because the Court
recognized a new procedural due process right to DNA testing.
CONCLUSION
The Osborne opinion charted new and uncertain terrain by establishing a
potentially significant procedural due process right to postconviction DNA
testing. The Court did not define the outer reaches of that due process right.
Yet contrary to early observations, the opinion may have some real
importance. Almost all states now choose to provide access to new
evidence of innocence postconviction. They must now do so in an adequate
and nonarbitrary fashion. The Court offered some guidance on what access
states must constitutionally provide. In doing so, the Court held out the
federal Innocence Protection Act as a model for an adequate set of
postconviction procedures regarding access to DNA testing. The Court also
broadened the reach of its hypothetical actual innocence right, but without
answering whether such a constitutional right will someday become more
than an operative assumption.
No floodgates have been opened by the decisions made or not made. The
vast majority of criminal cases are not suitable for DNA analysis. Most
prosecutors willingly agree to conduct DNA testing, state statute or not, for
reasons including that DNA testing often identifies an actual perpetrator.
To date, although more than 250 have been exonerated by postconviction
DNA testing, less than two dozen convicts have had to litigate access to
DNA claims in the federal courts, with several obtaining the testing that
proved their innocence. 290
Nevertheless, the newly established constitutional right intersects with an
important area of rapidly changing criminal justice jurisprudence. In one of
Justice Souter's last opinions on the Court, his praise for slow going in
matters of constitutional innovation explained the Court's hesitance in
Osborne, as in other cases in which the Court entered new constitutional
territory. His belief that judicial patience can be worn thin when justice is
too-long denied set the stage for what is to come post-Osborne. Although
the Court went slowly in Osborne, the decision created incentives for states
to go much faster. The liberty interest recognized and the continued
288. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
289. Id. at 2261-62.
290. See Starger, supra note 19, at 1050-51.
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constitutional assumption that a Herrera "actual innocence" right may exist
placed pressure on states to facilitate access to DNA testing. Even if courts
fail to rigorously enforce the Osborne due process right, the renewed
assumption of an actual innocence right may spur the states to adopt
"further change" primarily "by legislative revision and judicial
interpretation of the existing system."'291 Accuracy has eclipsed finality.
The DNA revolution will continue to promote consideration of new
evidence of innocence and in the words of the Court, to "lead to changes in
the criminal justice system. '292
291. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009).
292. Id.
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